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Fields v. State, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 57 (Dec. 10, 2009)1
 
 
Evidence - Prior Bad Act, Common Plan or Scheme, Unfair Prejudice 
 
Summary 
 Whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting prior bad act evidence 
because (1) it did not fall within the common-plan-or-scheme exception or because (2) its 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 The Court concluded first, that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the 
prior bad act evidence because the prior bad act was not similar enough to the crimes charged to 
be relevant as proof of a common plan or scheme. As to the second issue, the Court concluded 
that the probative value of the bad act evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. Finally, since the Court determined that the admission was not harmless, the 
action was reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
Relationship between the Fieldses and Palensky 
 Appellant, Linda Fields and her husband John Fields owned a bar in Elko, Nevada. 
Palensky was a regular customer of the Fieldses. In 2002, Palensky gave Linda power of attorney 
so she could take care of his affairs while he was in prison for over a year.  
Upon Palensky’s release, the Fieldses arranged for his trailer to be moved to their 
property and Palensky worked on their ranch until his disappearance in 2003. A month after 
Palensky’s disappearance, his body was found in a river near Salt Lake City, Utah. An autopsy 
concluded that Palensky had died of blows to the back of his head inflicted by a blunt instrument. 
The Fieldses alleged that, prior to his disappearance, Palensky made a will that made the Fieldses 
his heirs. 
Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Department initiated a murder investigation but subsequently 
abandoned it2
 
. Nearly three years later, Elko County detective McKinney began investigating the 
murder after Linda’s brother, Mike and his wife, Niqua, alerted police that Linda had told Niqua 
that Linda had killed Palensky by hitting him in the head with a pipe after she caught Palensky 
molesting her grandson. Mike and Niqua also told McKinney that the Fieldses used a red Toyota 
pickup to transport Palensky’s body.  McKinney located Palensky’s trailer and the Fieldses’ 
pickup and after a search, charged Linda with open murder with the use of a deadly weapon. 
Linda was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree. 
Bad act evidence- Mobert conspiracy 
 At trial, in an attempt to establish a possible motive linking Linda to Palensky’s murder, 
the State introduced evidence of a prior uncharged conspiracy involving the Fieldses and Mobert. 
Mobert, an elderly man in poor health, was the Fieldses’ friend and business partner. Mobert 
assigned Linda power of attorney to handle some affairs. The business relationship, however, 
soon soured and the Fieldses filed a civil suit against Mobert, who filed a counterclaim. Mobert 
                                                          
1 By Kimberly Duque 
2 Salt Lake County police did question the Fieldses regarding Palensky’s death and searched his trailer at the 
Fieldses’ ranch. 
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and the Fieldses settled this suit in 2000. In 2001, Elko detectives Pitts and Kidd, investigated 
Well’s (an informant)  allegation that the Fieldses had solicited him to murder Mobert.  The 
Fieldses were never charged for the “Mobert Conspiracy.” In 2007, Mobert died of natural 
causes, when Linda no longer held rights in Mobert’s property. Linda objected to the admission 
of the Mobert conspiracy evidence on the basis of relevancy and prejudicial value but the district 
court admitted the evidence with a limiting instruction.3
The State first called Corn, Mobert’s attorney in the civil suit between Mobert and the 
Fieldses, to testify that Linda had sold some of Mobert’s real property and without Mobert’s 
authorization, used the proceeds for personal expenditures. Next, the State called Pitts and Kidd 
who authenticated recorded conversations between Wells and the Fieldses where allegedly, the 
Fieldses solicited Wells to murder Mobert.  
   
By introducing evidence of the uncharged Mobert conspiracy, the State sought to convey 
that Linda, with both Palensky and Mobert, planned to take advantage of elderly men by 
obtaining power of attorney, using that power of attorney to get money and assets, and then 
murdering the elderly men for their estates. After deliberating, the jury returned a guilty verdict. 
The district court sentenced Linda and entered a judgment of conviction. This appeal followed.  
  
Discussion 
Admission of bad act evidence 
 The Court, pursuant to Braunstein, 4 deferred to the district court’s discretion in admitting 
evidence of prior bad acts and explained that it would not reverse such determinations absent 
manifest error.5
 The Court held that pursuant to NRS 48.045(2), prior bad act evidence is not admissible 
to prove character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith but may be 
admissible for other purposes, such as plan.
  
6 As a preliminary matter, a district court must 
determine whether: (1) the evidence is relevant, (2) the prior bad act is proven by clear and 
convincing evidence, and (3) the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the 
evidence’s probative value.7
 
 The present appeal focused on the first and third factors. 
Relevance and the danger of unfair prejudice 
 Prior bad act evidence is admissible pursuant to the common-plan-or-scheme exception 
of NRS 48.045(2) when both the prior bad act evidence and the crime charged constitute “an 
integral part of an overarching plan explicitly conceived and executed by the defendant.”8
 The Court held that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the 
prior bad act alleged as the “Mobert conspiracy” because although the State presented evidence 
of Linda’s financial motive to the jury, the State also presented an alternative motive- that 
Palensky molested her grandson- a theory not at all in line with the alleged elderly fraud scheme.  
  
                                                          
3 The district court issued the instruction pursuant to Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 733, 30 P.3d 1128, 1131 
(2001)(stating that the trial court, absent a waiver from the defendant, must give a limiting instruction explaining the 
limited purposes for which the bad act evidence may be used). 
4 Braunstein v. State, 118 Nev. 68, 72, 40 P.3d 413, 416 (2002). 
5 Id.  
6 NEV. REV. STAT. §48.045(2) (2007). 
7 Meek v. State, 112 Nev. 1288, 1292-93, 930 P.2d 1104, 1107 (1996). 
8 Ledbetter v. State, 122 Nev. 252, 260-61, 129 P.3d 671, 677-78 (2006) (quoting Rosky v. State, 121 Nev. 184, 
196, 111 P.3d 690, 698 (2005)). 
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The Court also rejected the State’s attempt to liken the financial circumstances 
surrounding the Palensky death to the Mobert death. Specifically, the State inaccurately 
portrayed Mobert and Palensky as similarly situated- “elderly, frail, and helpless,” when in fact 
they differed in age, health, and vigor. Moreover, Mobert died of natural causes years after the 
financial disputes between him and the Fieldses had been settled, whereas, Palensky was 
murdered and there was no dispute over money prior to his death. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the prior uncharged conspiracy and the present murder charge were not similar 
enough to be part of a preconceived plan.  
The Court further held that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of 
the Mobert conspiracy because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice and its admission led to serious jury confusion. First, evidence of the alleged 
solicitation was not relevant and its sole purpose was to show Linda’s bad character. Second, 
because Mobert and Palensky were not similarly situated, the probative value of the Mobert 
conspiracy was substantially lowered, thereby increasing its probability of causing prejudicial 
harm to Linda. Third, the State’s alternative theory of motive based on the alleged molestation in 
conjunction with an unrelated presentation of conspiracy evidence led to serious jury confusion. 
Fourth, because the State spent considerable time explaining the civil suit in intricate detail, the 
jury was likely confused with the differing standards of evidence in civil versus criminal 
proceedings. Finally, that Linda was not charged with conspiracy to commit murder, 
significantly increased the possibility of unfair prejudice and jury confusion. 
 
Harmless Error 
 The Court reviewed the district court’s nonconstitutional error pursuant to Kotteakos,9 
which is identical to NRS 178.598.  The test is whether the error “had substantial injurious effect 
or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.10
 
” The Court concluded that the district court’s 
improper admission of the bad act evidence was not harmless for two reasons: (1) the unfair 
prejudice Linda suffered from the admission substantially outweighed any probative value of 
such an admission; and (2) the error had a substantial and injurious influence in the jury’s verdict 
because the alleged prior bad act was so serious and potentially confusing.  The jury verdict 
could have been determined, in part, by Linda’s alleged solicitation to kill Mobert rather than on 
tying Linda to Palensky’s murder. 
Conclusion 
In compliance with, NRS 48.035 and NRS 48.045,11
                                                          
9 Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
 because the probative value of the 
prior bad act evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant and because the district court’s discretion in admitting the evidence was not harmless 
error, a new trial is warranted.  The Court concluded that the confusing admission of the tapes 
and the amount of time spent on discussing the uncharged conspiracy surely had an impact on 
the verdict. Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case. 
10 Id. at 776. 
11 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 48.035, 48.045 (2007). 
